Chinese state shippers have abandoned the Strait of Hormuz, forcing crude transfers offshore and testing whether bypass infrastructure can absorb the shock.
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China's tanker rerouting exposes Hormuz's 20.9 million bpd fragility
Chinese state shippers have avoided the Strait of Hormuz since late July, pushing Gulf of Oman ship-to-ship transfers past 600,000 barrels per day and exposing the limits of bypass capacity around the 20.9 million bpd chokepoint.
"There is no alternative to the Strait of Hormuz," Sheikh Nawaf Saud Al-Sabah, deputy chairman and CEO of Kuwait Petroleum Corp., said during CERAWeek 2026. The International Energy Agency estimates only 3.5-5.5 million barrels per day of operational crude-oil bypass capacity exists across Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
COSCO Shipping Energy Transportation and China Merchants Energy Shipping, which together control more than 100 very large crude carriers and handled roughly half of China's Middle East crude imports before the war began in late February, have kept their vessels out of both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, according to tanker tracker Vortexa and a ship broker. Daily freight for the Oman-China voyage reached $140,000 last Friday, generating roughly $110,000 per-tanker daily margins, up from $30,000-$40,000 before the conflict.
With approximately 89 percent of Hormuz crude flows destined for Asian markets — China, India, Japan and South Korea accounting for 74 percent — the rerouting carries systemic implications. Saudi Aramco President and CEO Amin Nasser estimated more than 2.6 billion barrels of oil have been lost from the global market since the war's outbreak, with inventory rebuilding potentially taking 18 months even if the Strait reopened immediately.
Bypass capacity covers a fraction of Hormuz's 20.9 million bpd flow
The IEA reports that only Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline and the UAE's Abu Dhabi-Fujairah line provide operational crude-oil bypass capacity of roughly 3.5-5.5 million barrels per day — a fraction of the 20.9 million barrels per day of petroleum liquids that transited Hormuz in the first half of 2025. The UAE is constructing a second Fujairah line of about 1.5 million barrels per day, expected operational in 2027, while Iraq began work in 2026 on the Basra-Haditha corridor with a planned capacity of about 2.5 million barrels per day.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has argued the Strait could become "just another body of water" within two years, with 50-70 percent of energy redirected through underground pipelines. Goldman Sachs projects more than 45 percent of pre-war Gulf oil exports could gain bypass capacity by end-2027 and more than 60 percent by end-2028. But the IEA cautions that no alternative routes exist for Qatar's and the UAE's LNG volumes, which account for nearly one-fifth of global LNG trade, and that the logistics required to reroute substantial Gulf flows have not been tested under stress.
Oman's six-port network anchors the resilience architecture
Oman's geographic position — spanning Hormuz, the Sea of Oman, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean — gives it a unique role in the emerging resilience architecture. The 238-kilometer Hafeet Rail project connecting Sohar Port to the UAE national rail network toward Abu Dhabi strengthens the land-maritime interface, while Duqm provides deep-water access directly to the Arabian Sea and Salalah anchors the network as one of the world's major container transshipment ports.
The strategic question now shifts from whether Hormuz can be bypassed to how many independent connections can remain functional when one component is disrupted. Asian economies, which bear the largest share of disruption costs, are increasingly positioned as co-investors in strategic storage, refining, LNG facilities and logistics infrastructure across the Gulf. China's pivot to Arctic shipping — Sea Legend launched the first regular container service through the Northern Sea Route, cutting Ningbo-to-Felixstowe transit time by half — illustrates the lengths importers will go to avoid Middle East chokepoints, though the route remains seasonal and operationally constrained.
The last comparable disruption came in 2019, when tanker seizures near Fujairah briefly spiked insurance premiums and freight rates, but the current closure has lasted months rather than weeks. If the Strait remains largely closed through 2027, the gap between theoretical bypass capacity and dependable operating throughput will become the defining constraint on Gulf energy exports.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
[1] China's state shippers deploy oil tankers outside Gulf, avoid chokepoints, sources say[2] The Hormuz Connectivity Doctrine: Beyond Chokepoints, Bypasses and Strategic Vulnerability[3] Middle East War Pushes China Toward the Arctic Trade Route[4] Can China’s new Arctic Sea route to Europe replace Middle East chokepoints?
